Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference by Glynn, Adam N. & Ichino, Nahomi
Supplementary Information for
“Using Qualitative Information to Improve Causal Inference”
Adam N. Glynn∗ Nahomi Ichino†
July 1, 2014
Contents
A Data 2
B Pair Matching 3
C The Sign Test 5
D Sensitivity Analysis on the Signs and Ranks 6
E Full Matching 9
F Replication Code 10
F.1 Paired Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
F.2 Full Matching Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
∗Department of Political Science, Emory University, 327 Tarbutton Hall, 1555 Dickey Drive, Atlanta, GA 30322.
aglynn@emory.edu
†Department of Political Science, University of Michigan, 5700 Haven Hall, 505 S. State St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109.
nichino@umich.edu
1
A Data
We exclude countries with population less than a half million in 1989 (Cape Verde, Comoros,
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe). We also exclude Djibouti, Sudan,
and Mauritania, which the United Nations and many scholars consider to be part of the Middle
East/North Africa region rather than sub-Saharan Africa. Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, and
South Africa are not presidential systems; Eritrea, Rwanda, Sudan, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda,
and Zaire/DRC did not hold transitional multi-party presidential elections in the 1990s. We also
exclude Namibia, which held its first post-independence election just before the turn of the decade.
Plurality rule for transitional presidential election (T) = 1 if transitional presidential elec-
tion used plurality rules, = 0 if it had a run-off provision to eliminate weaker candidates and
hold a second round election if no candidate met a vote threshold in the first round. Coded
from constitutions available through the African Legislatures Project (www.africanlegislatures
project.org), Africa Elections Database (africanelections.tripod.com), Consortium for Elec-
tions and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS) (www.electionguide.org), and Electoral
Institute for the Sustainability of Democracy in Africa website (www.eisa.org.za).
Opposition harassment (Y) = 1 if there is any reported incident of opposition harassment
before the election, = 0 otherwise. From National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy
(NELDA) dataset v3 (Hyde & Marinov 2012).
Civil conflict = 1 if there was a civil conflict leading into the transition, = 0 otherwise.
Frequency of political protests during the transition period, 1988–92 = 0 if none, = 1 if
some, = 2 frequent. To be counted, protests had to include explicit demands for political
rights or changes in political rulers. Coded by Bratton & van de Walle (1997b).
Experience with military rule Share of years from independence to the transition under mili-
tary rule, calculated using data from Bratton & van de Walle (1997b).
Ethnic Fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected people from a given country
will belong to different ethnic groups, restricted to groups with at least 1 percent of country
population (1990). The fractionalization index is 1 −∑Ni=1 p2i , where pi is the proportion of
people in each ethnic group and N is the total number of groups and ranges from 0 (perfectly
homogeneous) to 1 (highly fragmented). From Fearon (2003).
Log GDP per capita Log GDP per capita, PPP adjusted. From World Development Indicators
(data.worldbank.org/data-catalog), available through Quality of Government Dataset (Teorell
et al. 2011).
Former French Colony = 1 if formerly a French colony, = 0 otherwise.
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Private Credit Private credit by deposit money banks as share of GDP, averaged over the 5 years
before the transition. Calculated using data from Beck et al. (2000).
B Pair Matching
Authoritarian incumbents agree to hold multi-party elections because their right to rule has been
challenged. We are concerned that weaker incumbents – those without a strong party organization
or face a unified opposition – might be more likely to resort to opposition harassment and also
be more likely to adopt plurality rules for these transitional presidential elections. To address this
concern, we match a country that had a runoff provision (T = 0) to each country that used plurality
rules for the transitional presidential elections (T = 1). We pair match without replacement, exactly
on three variables and on Mahalonobis distance with two variables, using the optmatch package
version 0.8-1 (Hansen & Klopfer 2006) in R version 2.15.2.
The first matching variable is whether there was a civil conflict prior to the transition, since
former combatants can be readily mobilized to harass opponents, and electoral rules under these
circumstances are part of negotiated peace settlements designed to draw the armed factions into
electoral politics (Lyons 2004). The second matching variable is the frequency of political protests in
the transition period (coded as none, some, or frequent), as they indicate the public’s dissatisfaction
with the incumbent authoritarian regime. The third matching variable is experience with military
rule, measured as the share of years since independence that the country was under military rule.
We include this variable since countries with longer experience with civilian rather than military
rule have a greater opportunity to develop political parties, and incumbents with political parties
have stronger ties and better information about citizens and have the organization in place for
voter mobilization (Bratton & van de Walle 1997a). We match exactly on these three variables.
We match on Mahalonobis distance with two other variables. The first variable is log GDP per
capita, which affects the regime’s capacity to co-opt or repress the opposition (Bratton & van de
Walle 1997a). The second variable is ethnic diversity from Fearon (2003), operationalized as ethnic
fractionalization, which affects the complexity and difficulty of forming coalitions behind specific
presidential candidates. This matching procedure produces four pairs: Cameroon–Gabon, Kenya–
Coˆte d’Ivoire, Malawi–Zambia, and Tanzania–Guinea-Bissau. The data are presented in Table
1.
Log GDP per capita is larger for the treated unit in the fourth pair (Tanzania) than its matched
control country (Guinea-Bissau), but it is smaller for the treated unit in all other pairs. The
difference is greatest for the first pair, which includes Gabon, with its high oil revenues and a small
population. This imbalance, with a one-sided p-value of 2/16 using the signed rank statistic, is
not too troublesome for our analysis, because it will be improved by the subsequent full matching
procedure.
3
Pair Country Treated Ethnic Log GDP Civil Protest into Military
(s) (T ) Frac. per capita Conflict Transition Rule Exp.
1 Cameroon 1 0.887 7.509 0 Frequent 0
1 Gabon 0 0.858 9.585 0 Frequent 0
2 Kenya 1 0.852 7.199 0 Frequent 0
2 Coˆte d’Ivoire 0 0.784 7.548 0 Frequent 0
3 Malawi 1 0.829 6.364 0 Frequent 0
3 Zambia 0 0.726 7.092 0 Frequent 0
4 Tanzania 1 0.953 6.712 0 Some 0
4 Guinea-Bissau 0 0.818 6.457 0 Some 0
Table 1: Data with Pair Matching
There is also some imbalance on ethnic fractionalization (exact p-value of 1/16), which is lower
for the matched control country than the treated country in every pair. In particular, Tanzania has a
much greater ethnic fractionalization score than any of the twenty-four countries in our sample, and
the within-pair difference on this variable is largest for the Tanzania–Guinea-Bissau pair. There are
also a variety of concerns with this and other similar fractionalization measures, including debates
about what collection of people should count as an ethnic group, given the fluid nature of ethnicity,
inter-ethnic marriages, and the possibility of membership in multiple groups; differing depths of
divisions or social and cultural distance between groups; differing levels of salience of ethnicity in
politics; whether all possibly enumerated groups are relevant for a particular analysis; and how the
population shares of these groups can be best summarized. Tanzanian politics is frequently noted
for its lesser emphasis on ethnicity compared to other African countries, sometimes attributed
precisely to its large number of very small ethnic groups and to President Nyerere’s sustained
agenda of socialism and national integration (Kelsall 2003, Miguel 2004). Posner (2004) reviews
these concerns and has proposed an alternative fractionalization index of politically relevant ethnic
groups, but it is not clear how appropriate such a measure is in a highly fluid moment of political
transition and mobilization.
Nevertheless, it is important to match on some measure of ethnic diversity, since we believe
the coalition possibilities of the ethnic groups in a country affects opposition strength and hence
treatment assignment. Because we do not have strong theory for the relationship between ethnic
diversity and treatment assignment, we adopt this measure widely used in cross-national analyses for
the matching. We address the imbalance through additional qualitative information on opposition
strength affected by ethnic diversity.
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C The Sign Test
Even when absolute within-pair differences in outcomes cannot be ranked across pairs, we can
use the sign statistic. As indicated by its name, the sign statistic uses only the sign of the difference
in outcomes for each pair (sign(Ys1 − Ys2) for s = 1, ..., N1). The statistic is written as:
V =
N1∑
s=1
[Tsss1 + (1− Ts)ss2] =
N1∑
s=1
Vs
where ss1 = 1 if Ys1 > Ys2 and = 0 otherwise, and ss2 = 1 if Ys2 > Ys1 and = 0 otherwise. This is
the statistic implicitly used for McNemar’s test in the second section of the article.
Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4
s11 = 1 s21 = 0 s31 = 1 s41 = 0
s12 = 0 s22 = 0 s32 = 0 s42 = 0
Permutation T1 T2 T3 T4 V1 V2 V3 V4 V
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 2
2 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
3 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
4 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
5 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
7 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
8 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
9 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
10 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
11 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
12 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
14 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Permutation Distribution for McNemar’s Test Using the NELDA Data
With this statistic V , we can address the following hypothetical question: how likely is it that we
could have observed the result just by chance, that is, if plurality electoral rules had been assigned
by a coin flip within each pair? We calculate this p-value using Table 2 which presents the full
permutation distribution for the four pairs in our example under the sharp null hypothesis. Each row
in the table represents a different possible set of coin flip outcomes, with the first row corresponding
to the observed data with s = 2. We assume that the coin is fair, so that Pr(Ts = 1) = 1/2 for
each pair s = 1, ..., N1, and because there are 4 pairs, the probability of observing any individual
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row of Table 2 is 1/16. Because only rows 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the table have V ≥ 2, the one-sided
p-value is 4/16.
The example demonstrates one of the properties of McNemar’s test: concordant pairs, which
are pairs with the same value of the outcome variable, can be removed from the dataset without
affecting the p-value. In our example, the second pair (Kenya–Coˆte d’Ivoire) and fourth pair
(Tanzania–Guinea-Bissau) do not affect the V statistic in Table 2, since V2 = 0 and V4 = 0 for all
permutations. This reveals the limited power of using only a binary coding of the outcome variable
and a point for potential improvement with the introduction of qualitative information.
Using only the signs for each pair discussed in Section “Using Qualitative Information on the
Outcome” of the paper, the values for the V statistic change. The V4 column of Table 2 would
now take the value 1 for the odd rows of the table but keep the value 0 for the even rows. The
V2 column of Table 2 would now take the value 1 for rows 1–4 and rows 9–12, but keep the value
0 for the other rows. Our observed data in the first row would now produce the value of V = 4
while all other rows will still have V ≤ 3. Hence the V for the observed data is larger than the
V values for all other rows, and we have reduced the one-sided p-value to 1/16 = 0.0625. These
changes are reflected in Table 3. Notice that for a binary outcome variable, we only need to conduct
comparative studies for the concordant pairs to improve the power of the test. In this example,
we only needed to conduct two comparative case studies and determine which unit had the larger
outcome value within each pair.
D Sensitivity Analysis on the Signs and Ranks
One concern is how sensitive our analysis is to errors or disagreements about signs and ranks.
We can address this concern with a sensitivity analysis that calculates p-values for all possible
signs and ranks, but note that some disagreements over ranks will have no effect on the p-value.
For example, perhaps we cannot determine or agree on whether the Cameroon-Gabon pair or the
Kenya-Coˆte d’Ivoire pair has a greater absolute difference in outcomes. Suppose contrary to our
ranking, the Cameroon-Gabon pair is rank 4 and the Kenya-Coˆte d’Ivoire pair is rank 3. The p-
value we obtain from this adjusted ranking is the same as from our original ranking. More generally,
when Tsss1 + (1− Ts)ss2 = Ts′ss′1 + (1− Ts′)ss′2 for s 6= s′ and qs = qs′ + 1, then exchanging the
ranks for pairs s and s′ does not affect the p-value.
Furthermore, even errors in the signs are likely to have only small effects on the p-value, since
such errors are most likely to occur for the pairs where the magnitude of the within-pair difference
and the rank are small. For example, we might be concerned that we have missed some incidents
of opposition harassment in Guinea-Bissau that were only reported in Portuguese language me-
dia. However, even if upon reassessment we find that Guinea-Bissau had more harassment than
Tanzania, it is unlikely that the magnitude of this difference will be large, and therefore the rank
will remain the same q4 = 1. Because of the small rank, the sign reversal only generates a small
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Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4
s11 = 1 s21 = 1 s31 = 1 s41 = 1
s12 = 0 s22 = 0 s32 = 0 s42 = 0
Permutation T1 T2 T3 T4 V1 V2 V3 V4 V
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4
2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 3
3 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 3
4 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
5 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 3
6 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 2
7 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2
8 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
9 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 3
10 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 2
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2
12 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 2
14 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 3: Permutation Distribution for the Sign Test Using Within-Pair Qualitative Information to
Supplement the NELDA Data
difference in the p-value. Note that in this alternative, s41 = 0 and s42 = 1 so that we subtract one
from W in the odd rows and add one to W in the even rows of Table 4 (reproduction of Table 3
in the paper). Our observed W would now be 9, and the second row would have W = 10, but no
other row in the table would have a W as large as 9. Therefore, the p-value would only increase
from 1/16 to 2/16.
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Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4 Pair 1 Pair 2 Pair 3 Pair 4
q1 = 3 q2 = 4 q3 = 2 q4 = 1
s11 = 1 s21 = 1 s31 = 1 s41 = 1
s12 = 0 s22 = 0 s32 = 0 s42 = 0
Permutation T1 T2 T3 T4 W1 W2 W3 W4 W
1 1 1 1 1 3 4 2 1 10
2 1 1 1 0 3 4 2 0 9
3 1 1 0 1 3 4 0 1 8
4 1 1 0 0 3 4 0 0 7
5 1 0 1 1 3 0 2 1 6
6 1 0 1 0 3 0 2 0 5
7 1 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 4
8 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 3
9 0 1 1 1 0 4 2 1 7
10 0 1 1 0 0 4 2 0 6
11 0 1 0 1 0 4 0 1 5
12 0 1 0 0 0 4 0 0 4
13 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 3
14 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 2
15 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 4: Permutation Distribution for the Signed-Rank Statistic Using Within- and Between-Pair
Qualitative Information to Supplement the NELDA Data
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E Full Matching
With full matching, including exact matching on whether the country is a former French colony,
our data are grouped into three sets. The first set is former French colonies with “frequent” protests
in the transition period – Cameroon, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Gabon, and Madagascar. The second set
is former British colonies with “frequent” protests in the transition period – Kenya, Malawi, and
Zambia. The third set of countries are those with “some” protests in the transition period –
Tanzania and Guinea-Bissau. These comprised the fourth pair in the original analysis. Table 5
presents the data.
Set Country Treated Ethnic Log GDP Former Civil Protest Military Private
(s) (T ) Frac. per capita French Conflict Rule Credit
1 Cameroon 1 0.887 7.509 1 0 2 0 26.440
1 Coˆte d’Ivoire 0 0.784 7.548 1 0 2 0 35.452
1 Gabon 0 0.858 9.585 1 0 2 0 11.388
1 Madagascar 0 0.861 6.831 1 0 2 0 15.108
2 Kenya 1 0.852 7.199 0 0 2 0 17.806
2 Malawi 1 0.829 6.364 0 0 2 0 9.646
2 Zambia 0 0.726 7.092 0 0 2 0 7.222
3 Tanzania 1 0.953 6.712 0 0 1 0 4.496
3 Guinea-Bissau 0 0.818 6.457 0 0 1 0 3.230
Table 5: Data with Full Matching
Exact matching on civil conflict, protest leading into the transition, being a former French
colony, and a slightly weakened military rule variable completely determines the matched sets for
this dataset. However, we can still assess balance for other potential matching variables using
Quade’s statistic. For log GDP per capita, the one-sided p-value with Quade’s statistic is 11/24.
For ethnic fractionalization, the p-value is 1/24. For availability of private credit,1 measured by
private credit by deposit money banks as percentage of GDP, averaged for the five years prior
to the transition, the one-sided p-value with Quade’s statistic is 21/24. As before, we address
the imbalance on ethnic fractionalization through the overall qualitative assessment of opposition
strength.
1Arriola (2012) argues that private credit helps keep opposition coalitions financed and unified for transitional
and later elections in sub-Saharan Africa.
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F Replication Code
The analyses in the article can be replicated with the R code below. Some portions are made
significantly easier by using the R package qualCI v0.1 (Kashin, Glynn & Ichino 2014), which
includes the data from the Africa example in the article and functions to calculate the p-values and
qualitative confidence intervals.
F.1 Paired Design
The first p-value in the article is produced using an exact version of McNemar’s test on the
data in Table 1.
library(exact2x2)
exact2x2(matrix(c(1,0,2,1),nr=2), alternative="greater", paired=TRUE)
# the first 1 in the matrix corresponds to the zero/zero pair
# (Tanzania/Guinea-Bissau)
# the 0 in the matrix corresponds to the lack of a zero/one pair
# the 2 in the matrix corresponds to the two one/zero pairs
# (Cameroon/Gabon, Malawi/Zambia)
# the second 1 in the matrix corresponds to the one/one pair (Kenya/Cote d’Ivoire)
We produce the second p-value with the signed-rank test on the signs and ranks in Table 2.
We can use the standard Wilcoxon function on hypothetical data that correspond to the signs and
ranks of table.
wilcox.test(c(6,8,4,2),c(3,4,2,1), alternative="greater", paired=TRUE, exact=TRUE)
# Cameroon = 6
# Kenya = 8
# Malawi = 4
# Tanzania = 2
# Gabon = 3
# Cote d’Ivoire = 4
# Zambia = 2
# Guinea-Bissau = 1
Alternatively, under the assumption that we flip a fair coin for each pair, each row in the
permutation distribution in Table 3 has a 1/2 · 1/2 · 1/2 · 1/2 = 1/16 chance of occurring under the
sharp null hypothesis. Because the observed signed-rank statistic took its maximum value for this
example (W = 10), the p-value is just the probability for the first row (i.e., 1/16).
We can use qualCI to calculate the p-value and qualitative confidence interval:
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library(qualCI)
data(pluralityPairs) # data from the Africa example
between.ranks <- c(3,4,2,1)
dat <- quade.prep(data=pluralityPairs, set="pair", unit="country", treatment=
"plurality", withinRank="OppHarRank", betweenRank=between.ranks)
dat
qout <- quade(dat)
qout # p-value
qualCI(qout) # qualitative confidence interval
F.2 Full Matching Design
We use the Quade statistic to produce the p-value associated with using full matching (Table
6). This can be calculated by creating hypothetical data that correspond to the between-set and
within-set ranks of Table 5.
# Cameroon = 8
# Gabon = 6
# Cote d’Ivoire = 4
# Madagascar = 2
# Kenya = 10
# Malawi = 6
# Zambia = 3
# Tanzania = 2
# Guinea-Bissau = 1
d<- data.frame(c(1,1,1,1,2,2,2,3,3),c(8,6,4,2,10,6,3,2,1),rep(NA,9))
colnames(d)<-c("set","var","rank")
# within-set rank for units in set 1
d[1,3]<-rank(c(d[1,2], d[2,2], d[3,2], d[4,2]))[1]
d[2,3]<-rank(c(d[1,2], d[2,2], d[3,2], d[4,2]))[2]
d[3,3]<-rank(c(d[1,2], d[2,2], d[3,2], d[4,2]))[3]
d[4,3]<-rank(c(d[1,2], d[2,2], d[3,2], d[4,2]))[4]
# within-set rank for units in set 2
d[5,3]<-rank(c(d[5,2], d[6,2], d[7,2]))[1]
d[6,3]<-rank(c(d[5,2], d[6,2], d[7,2]))[2]
d[7,3]<-rank(c(d[5,2], d[6,2], d[7,2]))[3]
# within-set rank for units in set 3
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d[8,3]<-rank(c(d[8,2], d[9,2]))[1]
d[9,3]<-rank(c(d[8,2], d[9,2]))[2]
# between-set rank for set 1
q1<-rank(c((d$var[d$rank==4&d$set==1]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==1]),
(d$var[d$rank==3&d$set==2]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==2]),
(d$var[d$rank==2&d$set==3]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==3])))[1]
# between-set rank for set 2
q2<-rank(c((d$var[d$rank==4&d$set==1]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==1]),
(d$var[d$rank==3&d$set==2]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==2]),
(d$var[d$rank==2&d$set==3]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==3])))[2]
# between-set rank for set 3
q3<-rank(c((d$var[d$rank==4&d$set==1]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==1]),
(d$var[d$rank==3&d$set==2]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==2]),
(d$var[d$rank==2&d$set==3]-d$var[d$rank==1&d$set==3])))[3]
# each row is a different permutation of treatment assignment
m<-matrix(NA,ncol=5,nrow=24)
# Q1
m[,1]<-c(rep(q1*d[1,3],6), rep(q1*d[2,3],6), rep(q1*d[3,3],6), rep(q1*d[4,3],6))
# Q2
m[,2]<-c(rep(c(rep(q2*(d[5,3]+d[6,3]),2), rep(q2*(d[5,3]+d[7,3]),2),
rep(q2*(d[6,3]+d[7,3]),2)),4))
# Q3
m[,3]<-c(rep(c(q3*d[8,3],q3*d[9,3]),12))
# Q
m[,4]<-m[,1]+m[,2]+m[,3]
# note that by construction, observed data is the first row
m[,5]<-(m[,4]>=m[1,4])
mean(m[,5]) # p-value 1/24
Again, the observed statistic is the largest possible value of the Quade statistic. Therefore, if the
treatment assignment is “as if” random for our example, then pi1,{1,0,0,0} = 1(n1m1)
= 14 for s = 1,
pi2,{1,1,0} = 1(n2m2)
= 13 for s = 2, and pi3,{1,0} =
1
(n3m3)
= 12 for s = 3, and the p-value would be
pi1,{1,0,0,0} · pi2,{1,1,0} · pi3,{1,0} = 1/4 · 1/3 · 1/2 = 1/24.
pi1.1000 <- 1/4
pi2.110 <- 1/3
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pi3.10 <- 1/2
pi1.1000*pi2.110*pi3.10 # produces the p-value of 1/24
We conduct the sensitivity analysis by increasing the values of pi1,{1,0,0,0}, pi2,{1,1,0}, or pi3,{1,0}.
For example, the p-values in Table 7 of the paper can be reproduced with the following R code:
pi1.1000 <- c(1/4,1.25/4.25,1.5/4.5,2/5,2.5/5.5,3/6)
pi2.110 <- 1/3
pi3.10 <- c(1/2,1.25/2.25,1.5/2.5,2/3,2.5/3.5,3/4)
pi2.110*outer(pi1.1000,pi3.10) # produces the numbers before rounding
round(pi2.110*outer(pi1.1000,pi3.10),digits=3) # produces the numbers in the table
We can use qualCI to produce the p-values for the full matched design with the Quade statistic:
data(pluralitySets)
between.ranks <- c(2,3,1)
dat <- quade.prep(data=pluralitySets, set="set", treatment="plurality",
unit="country", withinRank="OppHarRank", betweenRank=between.ranks)
qout <- quade(dat)
qout
To produce the qualitative confidence interval,
qualCI(qout)
will offer the user several pairs of treated and control countries and ask for which pair the between-
set rank was most difficult to determine.
The following code will produce the sensitivity analysis in Table 7 using the qualCI package.
pi1 <- list(c(1/4,1/4,1/4,1/4),
c(1.25/4.25,rep((1-1.25/4.25)/3,3)),
c(1.5/4.5,rep((1-1.5/4.5)/3,3)),
c(2/5,rep(1/5,3)),
c(2.5/5.5,rep((1-2.5/5.5)/3,3)),
c(3/6,rep(1/6,3)))
pi3 <- list(c(1/2,1/2),
c(1.25/2.25,1-1.25/2.25),
c(1.5/2.5, 1-1.5/2.5),
c(2/3, 1/3),
c(2.5/3.5, 1-2.5/3.5),
c(3/4, 1/4))
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table7 <- matrix(data=NA, nrow=length(pi1), ncol=length(pi3))
for(m in 1:nrow(table7)){
for(n in 1:ncol(table7)){
dat[[1]]$prob <- pi1[[m]]
dat[[3]]$prob <- pi3[[n]]
table7[m,n] <- quade(dat)$pval
}
}
table7
14
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